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TRANSFERRING TRUST: RECIPROCITY NORMS 
AND ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan* 
Abstract: This paper presents four experiments testing the prediction 
that assignment of contract rights erodes the moral obligation to perform. 
The first three studies used an experimental laboratory game designed to 
model contractual exchange. Players in the games were less selfish with a 
previously-generous partner than with third-party player who had purchased 
the right to the original partner’s expected return. The fourth study used a 
web-based questionnaire, and found that subjects reported that they would 
require less financial incentive to breach an assigned contract than a 
contract held by the original promisee. The results of these four experiments 
provide support for the proposition that a permissible and apparently neutral 
transfer of a contractual right may nonetheless reduce the likelihood or 
quality of performance by weakening the norm of reciprocity. 
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TRANSFERRING TRUST: RECIPROCITY NORMS AND 
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers and legal scholars generally take assignment of contracts to be 
uncontroversial. Most contract rights are transferable, and assignment of 
contracts is very common in a number of legal contexts. Debt may be 
bought and sold; contracts may be transferred as part of an estate; and 
patents and trademarks are assigned. For most people, though, the idea of 
selling a contractual right is odd. The notion that the promisee can bind the 
promisor to perform for a third party without the promisor’s consent is in 
tension with ordinary ideas about promising and reciprocity. The impulse to 
reward trust with trustworthiness—to reciprocate generosity—is stymied 
when the generous first-mover is no longer a party to the transaction. In this 
paper, I argue that when contract rights are sold, the moral force of the 
contract is attenuated, encouraging breach when breach is otherwise more 
profitable than performance. 
The studies reported here use experimental psychological methods to 
test the prediction that a party to a contract is more likely to behave 
selfishly toward a third-party buyer or assignee than toward her original 
counterparty. The first three experiments employ laboratory games designed 
to model a stylized version of contractual exchange. The fourth study is a 
web-based questionnaire describing hypothetical breaches of contract. The 
results of these experiments provide support for the proposition that a 
permissible and apparently neutral transfer of a contractual right may 
nonetheless reduce the likelihood or quality of performance by weakening 
the importance of the norm of reciprocity.  
This paper begins with a brief review of the law of assigned contracts 
and the existing behavioral literature on trust and contract before presenting 
the methods and results of four new experiments. I conclude with a 
discussion of the implications and limitations of the reported results. 
I. LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY OF ASSIGNED CONTRACTS
A. Law of Assigned Contracts
The common law has accepted contract assignment since the nineteenth 
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century, taking the position that a right may be assigned as long as it is not 
prohibited by statute or by the terms of the contract, and if it would not 
“materially change the duty of the obligor.”1 Most contract rights are 
transferable, and assignment is common in a number of legal contexts, from 
bankruptcy to estate settlement. Sales contracts may be assigned, and 
assignees can sue for breach.2 And, of course, assignment of contract is 
crucial for the buying and selling of credit and debt.3 In the consumer credit 
world, the ability to transfer contracts is vital to the flow of credit from 
lenders to borrowers, so much so that Article 9 even limits parties’ abilities 
to contract around assignability.4  
In general, the buyers and sellers of contracts are business 
organizations, not individuals, and this paper does not purport to describe 
the moral intuitions of corporations or other institutional actors. However, 
ordinary people are party to a surprising range of contract assignments. 
When a company merges or is acquired, its customers’ obligations are 
transferred to the new entity. Individuals in debt are surely familiar with one 
of the most common forms of contract assignment, the sale of debt to a 
collection agency. Debt collection companies and small law firms buy bad 
debt from credit card companies for a small percent of the value of the debt, 
and then attempt to collect as much as they can of the balance.5 Many 
people also see a transfer of contract rights in the mortgage context. A 
borrower may originate a home loan at a local mortgage company, but it 
will almost always be sold to a larger financial institution at some point.6 
Free transferability is the rule and the norm, and even people who never so 
much as endorse a check to someone else will find their own contractual 
obligations assigned to other parties. As Farnsworth points out, “If the law 
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 
2 UCC § 2-210(2) (“[U]nless otherwise agreed, all rights of either seller or buyer can 
be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other 
party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair 
materially his chance of obtaining return performance.”) 
3 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.2, at 704 (4th ed., 2004) (citing the 
notion that debt is a saleable commodity as the foundation of the modern economy). 
4 UCC § 9-318(4) (“A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor 
is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an account…”) 
5 See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2185, 2261 (2007) (noting that debt collection agencies specialize in collecting loans 
and accounts in default for third parties). 
6 The Restatement (Third) of Property provides that mortgages are transferable unless 
the parties stipulate otherwise in the contract.6See also, Anna Gelpern & Adam Levitin, 
Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, 82 S.CAL. L.REV. 1075 (2009)(discussing loan transfers and securitization in the 
mortgage context).  
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were otherwise, our modern credit economy could not exist.”7 The question 
for this paper is how the commonsense understanding of a contract shifts 
when the right to performance changes hands.  
B. Moral Psychology of Contract
The hypothesis of this research is built on the premise that legal 
decision-making is affected by moral judgment, even when the legal regime 
does not reflect the prevailing moral view. Legal scholars and ordinary 
citizens alike debate the moral meaning of the contractual obligation. 
Charles Fried famously wrote that a contract is a promise, and that breach 
of a contract implicates the attendant moral violation of promise-breaking.8 
Law and economics scholars, on the other hand, have argued that a contract 
is just a promise to perform or pay damages, and that there is no particular 
moral harm in breaching and paying.9 As a descriptive matter, most people 
think of contract as a kind of promise, and of breach as a moral violation.10 
Furthermore, parties are sensitive to the moral context of breach. They are 
more punitive when they think the breacher was greedy or malevolent than 
when he was unfortunate or hapless.11 The studies below predict that the 
moral commitment to perform is stronger with respect to the original 
promisee than an assignee.  
To set up the hypotheses here, I begin with a brief review the existing 
literature on norms of reciprocity and exchange, and argue that these norms 
are weakened in the assigned contract context. One explanation for a 
promisor’s preference for performance over efficient breach comes from the 
reciprocity literature. People reward generosity and punish selfishness even 
when it is costly to do so. The Trust Game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe12 demonstrates the dynamic relationship between trust and 
7 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 704. 
8  See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 16 (1981) (“An individual is morally bound 
to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function is 
to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised performance. To 
renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally did 
invite.”) 
9 E.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract 
Remedies, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 687 (1986) (“Economic analyses reject the view of 
contract as promise, and replace it with the idea that contract law ought to promote 
‘efficiency.’ ” 
10 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in 
Breach of Contract, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 405 (2009) (showing that participants in a 
series of experiments were sensitive to the moral context of breach of contract). 
11 Id. at 417. 
12 Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, Trust, Reciprocity, and Social 
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trustworthiness, and it is the foundation for the method employed in the first 
three studies. In the original Trust game, two players, an Investor and a 
Trustee, are each given an initial endowment. The Investor is told that she 
can pass money to an anonymous Trustee, and that whatever amount she 
passes will be tripled. The Trustee then chooses how much of her wealth to 
pass back.13 The unique Nash equilibrium solution to this game is zero 
transfers.14 A purely self-interested Trustee will pass no money back. 
Knowing this, a self-interested Investor should pass none in the first 
instance. In fact, however, most Investors in the original studies passed a 
positive amount, averaging around $5 out of $10 dollars.15 And although 
some Trustees sent none or almost none back, a majority returned money, 
often more than the original investment. The average return on a $5 
investment was $7.17, on $10, $10.20.16  
However, generosity and reciprocity are sensitive to social factors, a 
finding from the trust literature with implications for the promisor-assignee 
relationship.17 A smaller “social distance” between the parties means a 
stronger commitment to perform on the contract. Social distance measures 
the quantity and quality of interaction between agents. Hoffman, McCabe 
and Smith measure quantity as “the degree of reciprocity that subjects 
believe exists within a social interaction.”18 For example, even small 
changes to the social framing of a Dictator game result in significantly 
different giving behavior. In a Dictator game, the player assigned to be the 
Dictator receives an initial endowment, and is instructed to allocate the 
money between herself and the Receiver, who has no money. When 
researchers engaged Dictators in a minor transaction with the experimenter 
before players made their giving choice, they saw fewer selfish allocations; 
the authors suggest that any sense that the player is not socially isolated 
increases giving.19 Social distance also involves the quality of the 
relationship, which is partly measured by identifiability, or the extent to 
History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEH. 122 (1995). 
13 Id. at 124-129. 
14 See id. at 123 (noting that a prediction of noncooperation should lead a rational 
investor to send zero). 
15 Id. at 123 (describing the baseline result that 30 of 32 investors sent money, with an 
average investment of $5.16). 
16 Id. at 131. 
17 See George A. Akerlof, Social Distance and Social Decisions, 65 ECONOMETRICA 
1005, 1006 (1997) (arguing that a rational choice analysis of social decisions must be 
sensitive to the social consequences of those decisions).  
18 Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith, Social Distance and Other-
Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 654 (1996). 
19 Id. at 658 (“As we weaken the anonymity or social isolation conditions…we observe 
that the offer distributions decrease as predicted.”) 
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which an other is known. For example, when Dictators know the family 
name of the Receiver, they are significantly more generous than when the 
Receiver is entirely anonymous.20 Low-level, meaningless information 
about a potential receiver, like the Receiver’s study-specific identification 
number, increases sympathy and giving.21  
A promisor and a promisee are closer to one another than a promisor 
and an assignee, and this may affect how the promisor thinks about breach. 
In the real world of contracts, the degrees of both reciprocity and 
identifiability differ as between an original promisee and an assignee. The 
initial drafting stage often provides information about the counter-party, as 
well as a set of reasons to reciprocate. As such, the social distance literature 
supports a prediction of higher levels of cooperation between the original 
counterparties than between the promisor and a third-party assignee. 
Of course, trust and trustworthiness are implicated not only in direct 
exchanges, but also in indirect chains of helping behavior. Buyers of debt, 
for example, are indirectly contributing to the financial well-being of the 
debtor in that the ability to buy and sell debt is what keeps the flow of credit 
available. One could conceivably predict that people feel a kind of indirect 
debt toward such buyers, which encourages performance. Studies on the 
role of indirect reciprocity have been somewhat equivocal. Two sets of 
studies have used a Trust game set-up to test the effect of indirect 
reciprocity by asking Trustees to send money back to Investors who were 
originally paired with other partners—in other words, Trustees were asked 
to reward an Investor’s generosity to someone else. Some researchers found 
no difference22 and others found bigger returns in the direct reciprocity 
condition.23 The role of indirect reciprocity in assigned contract situations 
in the real world is an open question, and one that this paper will not 
resolve. In some cases, it makes sense to think of third-party buyers as 
                                                 
20 See Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, What’s in a Name? Anonymity and Social 
Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, 68 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 29, 32 (2008) 
(reporting results from an experimental game). 
21 See Deborah Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: 
Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 13 (2003) (using an anonymous 
Dictator game to show differential giving between a probabilistic future recipient and one 
whose identification number has already been chosen). 
22 See Martin Dufwenberg, Uri Gneezy, Werner Guth, and Eric van Damme, Direct vs. 
Indirect Reciprocity: An Experiment. 18 HOMO OECONOMICUS 19, 24 (2001) (describing 
the study’s methodological approach). 
23 See Nancy R. Buchan, Rachel T.A. Croson, and Robyn M. Dawes, Swift Neighbors 
and Persistent Strangers: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social 
Exchange, 108 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 168, 187 (2002) (describing the structure of the 
experiment). 
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important contributors to the overall system. The availability of mortgage 
credit, for example, is heavily dependent on the ability of smaller banks to 
sell their loans to larger financial institutions. In other cases it is not clear 
that the third party has contributed to the social good in a way that a 
promisor might want to reward. When that is true, the assignee only 
“deserves” performance insofar as subjects believe that mere ownership 
confers a moral right. In the first study, reported below, I test the basic 
hypothesis that people will be more generous toward someone who has 
been directly generous to them than toward someone who owns the right to 
that reciprocal generosity but has not obviously behaved generously herself. 
I also use survey questions to probe subjects’ feelings of friendliness and 
indebtedness toward the other players in the game.  
II. STUDY 1: TRANSFERRED TRUST GAME 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that an assigned contract engenders less 
reciprocity from a promisee than a contract held by the original promisor, 
the first three experiments used an experimental game design intended to 
evoke some key features of contractual exchange. Participants played a 
laboratory game in which they were confronted with real incentives (e.g., 
they were paid based on their choices). In line with previous studies of 
contractual relationships, the method is based on a Trust game paradigm.24 
A traditional Trust game has only two players, but this game included a 
third player who was able to buy the right to the Trustee’s return. From the 
subjects’ perspective, this game was not explicitly about contract; like most 
economics experiments purporting to deal with contract25, it was only 
described to them in terms of players and payoffs.26 The contractual 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On 
Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 131, 133 (2001) 
(using a Trust game to test the effect of enforcement on contract performance). 
25 See, e.g., Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, Naked Exclusion: An Experimental 
Study of Contracts with Externalities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1850, fn 33 (2009) (using a 
context-free game to test the effect of communication on exclusive contracts) ; see also 
Ernst Fehr, Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement 
Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 836 (1997) (using a repeated 
Trust game to demonstrate the effect of opportunities for reciprocity on worker effort in the 
employment contract context). 
26 The choice of an experimental game method in these cases has some notable 
disadvantages, because it is precisely the explicit contract context that implicates so many 
informal norms. The context-free approach brings benefits, too, however, including a clean 
design free as much as possible from confounding variables, and direct comparability with 
other economics experiments that deal with reciprocity. Study 4 offers a more context-rich 
approach, and I will also take up a discussion of the generalizability of these results in the 
Discussion section of this Article. 
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relationship was represented by the sequence of choices: the first player has 
to decide whether or not to enter the relationship, not knowing whether the 
second player will perform. The second player, like the promisor, has 
already received the benefit of the deal and must decide whether and how to 
reciprocate the first player’s trust.27  
Of course, in a real contract situation, parties need not trust one another 
as long as they believe that a court will enforce their respective obligations. 
In this respect, the Trustee’s decision is perhaps best (though not perfectly) 
analogized to an efficient breach scenario, in which the would-be breacher 
is better off breaching, but knows that the promisee prefers performance. 
Does the promisor facing profitable breach take into account the identity of 
the counterparty when deciding whether or not to perform? This decision is 
the main variable of interest: when it comes time for the promisor to 




Study 1 was conducted in the Wharton Behavioral Lab at the University 
of Pennsylvania. Participants were students and staff at the University of 
Pennsylvania. They were paid a base rate $10 for participating in the 
session, and then the remainder of their earnings was determined by their 
choices in the game. Subjects were recruited to participate in a series of 
tasks for different researchers who use the Wharton Behavioral Laboratory. 
This was the first task of the session. Participants played the game on 
computers, and could not see one another during the session. Each player 
picked a number out of a bowl, and used that ID number to log into the 
game. Subjects played anonymously with one another. Players read the 
instructions and then took a 6-question quiz about the rules of the game. A 
research assistant answered any questions. 
The game design was as follows.28 Participants could play the role of 
Sender, Receiver, or Assignee. (In the experiment, the roles were not named 
in this way; in keeping with experimental game norms, players just received 
descriptions of the roles with the labels Player A, B, and C, respectively.) 
                                                 
27 Modifications are partly based on the method used by Coffman, in which a passive 
intermediary player is used to separate the sender and the receiver. Lucas Coffman, 
Intermediation Reduces Punishment (And Reward), unpublished manuscript, Harvard 
University, Department of Economics, on file with author. 
28 The complete text of the instructions and questions used in Study 3 is provided in 
the Appendix. With the exception of differences outlined in the Methods section of Study 
3, that game uses the same language and sequence of decisions as the game described here. 
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The Sender began with 10 tokens, at an exchange rate of 1 token = $.50. 
The Assignee began with 11 tokens. The Receiver began with 0 tokens. The 
Sender was the first mover. The Sender had the option to keep all 10 tokens 
or to pass 5 tokens to the Receiver. The Receiver’s money then tripled upon 
receipt, to 15.  
If the Sender chose to keep the right to the Receiver’s return, the game 
proceeded like a standard Trust game in which the Receiver then decided 
how much to return to the Sender. Alternatively, the Sender could choose to 
“sell” the right to the Receiver’s return. If the Sender chose to sell, the 
Assignee paid 6 tokens for the right to the Receiver’s return, meaning that 
the Sender could choose to transfer the right to the return and take 6 tokens 
from the Assignee, who was a passive player. This left the Sender with 11 
tokens, the Assignee with 5 tokens, and the Receiver with 15 tokens. The 
Receiver knew whether or not Sender had sold the right, and therefore 
which player would receive the return. The primary dependent variable in 
the following experiments is the amount of the Receiver’s return, which is 
the amount the Receiver sent to either the Sender or the Assignee, 
depending on the Sender’s choice. The amount of the return is predicted to 
be lower when the Receiver is transferring to the Assignee than when the 
Receiver is transferring to the Sender. Figure 1 shows a diagram of the 
Receiver’s position at the time of return.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of three, but they were not 
immediately assigned to a role within the group. In order to maximize the 
amount of data collected, players made a series of conditional choices. They 
were informed that their payoffs would be determined by their decisions in 
the roles to which they were respectively assigned, but that they would not 
know which roles they were playing until after all decisions were made, 
meaning that a player should make each decision as though she would be 
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Figure 1. Diagram of players’ moves at time of Receiver’s return 
decision, when returning to Sender, and when returning to Assignee. 
Return to Sender 
  
Return to Assignee 
 
Note: Schematic of game used in Studies 1-3, shown at time of Receiver return choice. 
Gray lines and numbers show transfers that have already taken place, and the bold black 
arrow shows where the Receiver will send her return. Each player’s current endowment at 
the time of the Receiver’s decision is indicated in parentheses. 
All of the subjects answered the Receiver-role questions first. Half 
reported first on the return to the Sender (Sender condition) and then on 
return to Assignee, and half saw the Assignee-return first and the Sender-
return question second (Assignee condition). Each subject then reported 
whether she would pass money to the Receiver if assigned to the role of 
Sender, and, if so, whether she would sell the right to the return to the 
Assignee. After all the decisions were made, the computer program 
randomly assigned roles. Subjects were paid according to the decisions they 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1984656
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had made for the assigned role.  
After participants played the game, but before they found out their final 
payouts, they were asked to answer a series of questions about their feelings 
and impressions of the game. After each question the subject chose a 
number from 1 to 7, with 1 being “not at all” and 7 being “very much.” 
1. To what extent did you have positive feelings toward Player A when 
Player A passed 5 to you and did NOT sell the right to your return?  
 
2. To what extent did you have positive feelings toward Player A when 
Player A passed 5 to you and DID sell the right to your return? 
 
3. To what extent did you feel angry or offended toward Player A when 
Player A passed 5 to you and DID sell the right to your return?  
 
4. To what extent did you have positive feelings toward Player C?  
 
5. When you were Player B and making a decision about how much 
money to transfer to Player A (the first mover), to what extent did you 
feel indebted to Player A?  
 
6. When you were Player B and making a decision about how much 
money to transfer to Player C, to whom player A had sold the right to 
your return, to what extent did you feel indebted to Player C?  
 
7. To what extent do you think it is morally wrong to pass back nothing to 
Player A? 
 
8. To what extent do you think it is morally wrong to pass back nothing to 
Player C?  
B. Results 
 
92 subjects participated over the course of three days, 63 of whom 
were female.29 Ages of participants ranged from 18 to 34, with a median 
age of 21. In the Sender role, 80 chose to pass to the Receiver and 12 to 
keep the initial endowment. Of the 80 players who passed money to the 
                                                 
29 In Studies 1 and 2 using subjects from the Wharton Behavioral Lab subject pool, 
aggregate demographic data is available, but it is not linked to dependent variable data, so 
comparisons of men and women are not possible. Analyses in Studies 3 and 4 include sex 
differences. 
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Sender, 66 sold the right to the return to the Assignee. The median and 
mode return to Senders and to Assignees was 5. Average earnings were 
$5.09, in addition to the $10 subjects received as a show-up fee. 
1. Main Effect: Back-Transfers to Senders and Assignees 
 
The primary comparison of interest was the amount that players in the 
Receiver position passed back to the Sender and the Assignee. In order to 
compare these variables, I organized data analysis as four distinct questions, 
answered in turn below. A summary of the first three analyses is presented 
in Table 1. 
a. Did subjects in the Assignee condition (subjects who answered the 
Assignee question first) return less money than subjects in the Sender 
condition (subjects who saw the Sender question first)? This is a 
between-subjects analysis.  
 
Receivers were randomly assigned to return to either the Sender or the 
Assignee first. This is the basis of the between-subjects analysis. In this 
case, there was no main effect between-subjects. Receivers returning to 
Senders returned an average of 3.87 tokens; Receivers returning to 
Assignees passed 3.85.  
b. Were Receivers in the Assignee condition more likely to be greedy, e.g., 
to return less than 5, than subjects in the Sender condition? 
 
Similarly, Receivers were no more likely to be stingy with Assignees than 
they were with Senders. 58% of subjects returning to Senders gave 5 or 
more; 57% of Receivers returning to Assignees gave 5 or more. 
c. Were Receivers in the Sender condition more likely to be generous, e.g., 
to return more than 5? 
 
Receivers were significantly more likely to be generous with Senders than 
with Assignees. 31.3% of Receivers passed back more than 5 to Senders, 
but only 9.1% did so when passing to a Assignee. This difference is highly 
significant (t=2.75, df=79.48, p=.0074). A summary of the between-subjects 
results (analyses presented in a-c) is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Receiver Return Rates by Condition 
 Mean 
Return 
Percent Defaulting  
(return less than 5) 
Percent Generous 
(return more than 5) 
Sender 
Condition 
3.87 58% 31.3% 
Assignee 
Condition 
3.85 57% 9.1% 
Note: Mean return shows how many tokens (worth $0.50 each) the Receiver in a Trust 
game returned to either the original Sender, or to an Assignee who had purchased the right 
to the Receiver’s return. Second and third columns code Receiver returns as either 
defaulting (returning less than the Receiver sent) or being generous (returning more than 
the Receiver sent). 
d. Did the average subject give less to the Assignee than the Sender (a 
within-subjects analysis)? 
 
When Receivers returned to both the Assignee and the Sender in turn, they 
gave less to the Assignee than the Sender. A given Receiver, on average, 
gave 3.99 to the Sender but only 3.45 to the Assignee (t=2.484, df=91, 
p=.0148). Another way to think about this difference is that 37.0% of the 
subjects gave less than 5 when returning to the Sender, but 47.8% were 
stingy when they were returning to the Assignee (t=2.175, df=91, p=.032). 
Interestingly, this within-subjects difference is order-dependent. 
Subjects who returned to the Sender first gave an average back-transfer 3.85 
to Senders and then 3.07 to the Assignees (t=2.474, df=47, p=.017). 
Receivers in the Assignee condition, returning to Assignee first, gave an 
average of 3.87 to Assignees and 4.14 to Senders, a non-significant 
difference (mean difference=.273, p=.356). In other words, subjects were 
willing to decrease their transfer in response to the moral distinction 
between the cases, but not to increase it, likely a result of motivated 
reasoning. On the first pass, with little to anchor their responses, the 
subjects in both conditions transferred a similar average amount. Then, 
those who saw the Assignee second may have been inclined to reason that 
the Assignee did not deserve a return as big as the Sender’s. Those who saw 
the Sender second may have been more likely to reason that a transfer good 
enough for the Assignee is fine for the Sender, too. 
2. Survey Responses 
 
Some of the survey questions were meant to get a basic sense of how 
subjects perceived the game, and others were deliberately comparative (all 
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comparisons are within-subject). Survey responses did not differ by 
condition. The primary comparison was in feelings toward Senders vs. 
Assignees. Figure 2 shows the mean comparisons. Players had more 
positive feelings about the Sender than the Assignee (t=5.55, df=91, 
p<.0001). They felt less indebted to the Assignee than the Sender (t=6.739, 
df=91, p<.0001). Finally, they thought that passing back nothing to the 
Assignee was significantly less morally wrong than passing nothing to the 
Sender (t=7.805, df=91, p<.0001).30 
Subjects felt more positively toward a Sender who held the right to the 
return than to one who sold it. Subjects rated their positive feelings at 4.75 
for a Sender who held the rights and 4.18 for one who sold (t=2.836, df=91, 
p=.006). Overall, though, subjects were not terribly put off by a Sender who 
sold. The average rating for anger at a selling Sender was 2.84. 
Furthermore, participants still had more positive feelings for a selling 
Sender than for an Assignee. Recall that they rated positive feelings for a 
selling Sender at 4.18; they rated the level of positive feelings for the 
Assignee at only 3.67, a significant difference (t=3.116, df=91, p=.002). 















   
Tow  
Tow  
                                                 
30 One interesting suggestion that this paper does not address is that Receivers were 
more personally gratified by returning to Senders than to Assignees. This is a plausible 
explanation, but not one that I have evidence to assess. The survey deals exclusively with 
moral obligation questions (moral wrongness, indebtedness) and neglects the possibility of 
moral satisfaction altogether, though the question would be an interesting one for future 
research.  
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Note: Feelings questions were answered on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 was “not at all” and 7 
was “very much.” 
This study provided some suggestive evidence that subjects 
distinguished between Senders and Assignees, both in their behavior and in 
their self-reported feelings. The following study uses a nearly identical 
method, with the addition of a small penalty. The addition of the penalty 
serves two purposes. First, it may have the effect of magnifying the costs of 
cooperation and selfishness. Second, it is intended to roughly mimic the 
contracts scenario in which parties indeed face external sanctions when they 
choose to breach. 
III. STUDY 2: ASSIGNED CONTRACT GAME WITH PUNISHMENT 
 
The second experiment was based on a Trust game with a weak 
sanction. In the original paper describing the Trust game with sanctions, 
Fehr and Rockenbach permitted Investors to choose the desired back-
transfer, and to decide whether or not to impose a punishment on Trustees 
who did not pass back the desired amount.31 The results of that study 
showed that no matter what amount the Investor transferred and requested, 
the back-transfers were higher when there was no fine imposed and lower 
when the Investor imposed a fine. In the sanction game, for at least some 
players, the presence of the sanction “crowds out” the informal reciprocity 
norm. In the following experiment, players who did not pay back their 
“debt” with interest (that is, who returned less than 6) forfeited one token to 
the experimenter. The hypothesis of the study reported below is that the 
erosion of the norm is exacerbated when the obligation is transferred. 
A. Method 
The set-up of the game was exactly the same as that of Study 1, 
including the same language in the instructions, with the exception of the 
sanction instruction. Subjects were instructed that if the Receiver returned 
fewer than 6 tokens, whether to the Sender or to the Assignee, that the 
Receiver would automatically pay a 1-token penalty to the experimenter. 
This means that in this game, the expected level of cooperation was made 
explicit. Note that for all players, it is cheaper to pay the penalty than to 
obey the rule of returning 6. This study had no post-game survey. 
                                                 
31 Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human 
Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 138 (2003) (reporting that players in an experimental game 
were less likely to reciprocate altruistic behavior when a partner could use sanctions to 
punish non-cooperative behavior). 
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B. Results 
 
209 subjects participated in the experiment, including 83 men and 137 
women. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 65, with a median age of 21. 
Subjects received an average of $4.66 for this game; they were also paid 
$10 for showing up and completing other questionnaire studies. This game 
was the fourth task that the subjects completed during the session. Subjects 
returned between 0 and 11 tokens. The median and mode return to both 
Sender and Assignee was 6 tokens.  
The primary comparison was between the Receivers’ returns to Senders 
and Assignees, looking first at only the first decision of each player in order 
to do a between-subjects analysis. In this study, that difference was 
significant. Receivers in the Sender condition passed back an average of 
5.07 tokens. Receivers who passed to the Assignee first passed back an 
average of 4.35 tokens. This difference is marginally significant, two-tailed 
(t=1.914, df=200.9, p=.057).  
The second question is whether the overall likelihood of “default” 
differed across condition. Recall that in this study, default is defined 
differently: any return less than 6 constitutes default, because anything less 
than 6 is punished with a one-token penalty. Receivers defaulted 27.8% of 
the time when they were passing to the Sender. When they were passing to 
the Assignee, they defaulted in 43.6% of cases. This difference is 
statistically significant (t=2.398, df=201.3, p=.017). In this study, there was 
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Note: Graph shows between- and within-subjects comparisons of Receiver’s return in 
Study 2, measured in $0.50 tokens, to either the original Sender in a Trust game, or to a 
third-party, the Assignee, to whom the Sender has sold the rights to the Receiver’s return. 
Between-subjects data is a comparison between subjects who made the return-to-Sender 
decision first and those who made the return-to-Assignee decision first. Within-subjects 
comparisons look to how an average Receiver responded to each condition in turn. 
Finally, the within-subject difference between returns to Senders and 
Assignees was also significant in the predicted direction. On average, a 
given subject returned 4.34 tokens to the Assignee, a half-token less than 
the average 4.84 return to the Sender (t=3.492, df=208, p=.001), defaulting 
on Senders in 33.5% of the cases and on Assignees in 41.1% (t=2.707, 
df=208, p=.007). As in Study 1, this difference was driven primarily by the 
subjects in the first condition, who returned to the Sender first. Those 
subjects, many of whom were generous to the Sender, then gave 
significantly less to the Assignee in the next round. Subjects who returned 
to the Assignee first started at a lower return and only rarely increased their 
transfer in the subsequent return-to-sender decision. 
In Studies 1 and 2, subjects showed an overall preference for generosity 
toward the Sender. This result offers some preliminary support for the 
hypothesis that the moral obligation to reciprocate the Sender’s generosity 
is more compelling than the obligation to send money to an Assignee who 
has purchased the return. There are possible objections to this interpretation, 
and to its applicability to contract, however.  
First, one might think the Receiver sends less upon transfer because she 
is unhappy that the Sender no longer wants to be partners. This would 
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suggest that the identity of the counterparty is irrelevant, and that the lower 
returns are a function of the player’s annoyance or sense of betrayal rather 
than the different moral standing of Senders and Assignees. This 
explanation is at least partially answered by the subjects’ reports from Study 
1 that they felt little anger toward transferring Senders, and in fact had more 
positive feelings for a Sender that sent money and then sold the right to the 
return than for an Assignee.  
It is still possible, though, that a Receiver might believe that if the right 
is sold, it means that the Sender did not think that the Receiver was going to 
return at least 6. A Receiver might take this as a sign of the norm: Receivers 
in this game do not reciprocate. This is a problem that Study 3 tries to deal 
with by enforcing only those transfers that include both a seller (the Sender) 
and a buyer (the Assignee), meaning that at least one player was expressing 
optimism about the Receiver’s return. 
Study 3 also takes up another objection to the interpretation of the 
results of Studies 1 and 2. The results of the first two studies suggest that 
reciprocity itself, rather than mere ownership of the right to the Receiver’s 
return, is an important driver of the Receiver’s generosity. I have suggested 
that this has implications for contract; namely, that promisors feel indebted 
and grateful toward first-performing promisees but do not feel that way 
toward assignees, and are therefore more likely to breach when breach is 
profitable. However, generalizability to the contracts context may be limited 
by an important missing element, mutual agreement. In the first two studies, 
the Sender voluntarily enters a relationship with the Receiver, but the 
Receiver’s reciprocal obligation is entirely implicit. In the following study, 
Receivers who want to encourage a Sender to pass money must indicate 
their explicit agreement to provide a reasonable return.  
IV. STUDY 3: TRUST GAME WITH AGREEMENT 
 
Study 3 used the core Trust game methodology from Study 2, with the 
penalty, but included several modifications. The goal was to track the 
trajectory of the life of a contract, in which the parties agree to an exchange, 
and the promisee performs soon thereafter. Before the time of the 
promisor’s performance, the promisor is tempted to breach or perhaps just 
shirk. The promisor then either breaches/shirks or performs, and the 
transaction is concluded. 
For the purposes of the game, this meant a few important changes to the 
traditional Trust game. Most importantly, the Receiver, the promisor, had to 
indicate agreement to provide a reasonable return on the Sender’s 
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investment before the Sender, the promisee, chose whether or not to pass 
money. However, this agreement raised a new problem. Typically we think 
of breachers as being good-faith dealers who intended at signing to perform 
on the contract. Between signing and performance, the breachers encounter 
new information or a change of circumstances, and their intentions change. 
In this game, and most experimental games, the players would normally 
have full information about the game from the outset, including the fact that 
the right to the return may be sold. This means that those who know that 
they will behave selfishly in one or both cases would either have to admit as 
much up front—in which case no rational Senders would pass them any 
money—or they would have to lie. Because many subjects would be 
uncomfortable with the knowledge that they had lied, there was a real 
concern that no Receivers would be willing to behave selfishly at all. 
In order to get around this problem and encourage some selfishness, 
Receivers got new information between agreement and return. They learned 
that both Senders and Assignees would receive a 5-token “bonus” no matter 
what the Receiver decided. The purpose of this bonus was two-fold. First, 
the bonus information changed the parameters such that Receivers could 
feel excused because the game had changed, and they said yes before they 
understood the situation. More specifically, it made Receiver-default seem 
less harmful. Senders and Assignees would not be left very badly off from 
their decision to trust. (In this design, there is no way to know whether 
those Receivers who ultimately defaulted intended to do so from the 
beginning, or decided to default after learning about the bonus.) 
This game included one additional change noted above. In Study 3, the 
Sender and the Assignee both had to agree to the transfer in order for the 
Receiver’s return to go to the Assignee. When the Assignee is passive, one 
possible interpretation of the Sender’s choice to transfer the right to the 
return is that the Sender expects the Receiver to default. Thus, it could be 
the signal from the Sender, rather than the identity of the recipient, that 
causes the increased rate of default. If the Assignee must agree to the 
transfer, at least one player, the Assignee, would seem to expect the 
Receiver to perform as promised.  
A. Method 
 
Players were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania student and 
staff population. Participants played the game in the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Psychology department computer laboratory, seated at 
carrels separated so that screens could not be seen by other players. Subjects 
read the game instructions before they began. The basic game structure 
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follows the Trust Game reported in Experiments 1 and 2, with 
modifications as noted. The entire game text is available in the Appendix 
attached to this article. 
As in the previous games, if the Sender chose to transfer 5 to the 
Receiver, the Sender then chose whether to retain the right to the Receiver’s 
return, or to offer to sell it to the Assignee for 6 tokens. In this game, the 
Assignee was not passive. The sale of the Receiver’s return did not go 
through unless the Assignee also agreed to it. If both agreed to the sale, the 
Sender had 11, the Assignee had 5, and the Receiver had 15. Once the 
Sender’s and the Assignee’s decisions have been made, the Receiver 
decided how much to return. Receivers knew that if they return less than 6 
to the Sender, they pay one token to the experimenter. 
After reading the instructions giving these basic rules of the game, each 
subject made an initial decision in the role of the Receiver, Player B. They 
read, “Please answer the following question, which we will show to Player 
A before he or she makes her transfer decision. If Player A transfers 5 to 
you, do you agree to return at least 6?” Players then saw a box with the text, 
“If Player A transfers 5 to me, I agree to return no less than 6 to him/her.” 
They had to click either “I Agree” or “I Do Not Agree” before continuing 
with the game. 
Every subject was then asked to continue to play the role of the 
Receiver for the first set of decisions. Players indicated their preferred 
return for two possible situations, one in which they were returning to the 
Sender and one in which he right had been sold and the return would be 
passed to the Assignee. Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups. 
One group saw the return-to-Sender question first, and the other saw the 
Assignee question first. 
Before making that decision, they read the following: “Please note that 
Player A and Player C will now be given a 5-token bonus by the 
experimenter at the end of the experiment.” 
Each player then made all possible decisions in the role of Player A—
whether to invest with a Receiver who did agree to return 6, and whether to 
invest with one who did not; whether to keep the rights to the Receiver’s 
return with a Receiver who did agree to return 6, and whether to keep those 
rights with one who did not.  
Each player then made Player B’s decisions, whether or not to buy 
Player C’s back-transfer from Player A when Player C has agreed to 
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transfer 6 and when Player C has not, respectively. Finally, each participant 
answered survey questions about their perceptions and reactions to the 
game before learning the role and payout information. 
B. Results 
 
129 subjects participated in this study, 69 of whom were female. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 48, with a median age of 21.32 
In the role of Receiver, only 12 of the 129 subjects indicated that they 
did not agree to return at least 6. Those subjects were excluded from the 
main analyses, since they had explicitly declined to participate in the 
contract. When the Receiver agreed to return 6, 72.6% of Senders opted to 
pass 5 rather than hold their endowments. When the Receiver did not agree, 
only 17.1% of Senders chose to pass money (remember that in this game, 
the Sender cannot be sure that she will be able to sell her right to the 
Receiver’s return, unlike the last game in which it always made sense for a 
Sender to pass 5). Of Senders who indicated that they would pass 5 to a 
Receiver who had agreed to return at least 6, 51.7% preferred to transfer the 
right to the Receiver’s return to the Assignee. 38.5% of Assignees indicated 
that they would be willing to pay 6 tokens for the right to the Receiver’s 
return. The median and mode return, to both Senders and Assignees, was 6. 
The hypothesis of this study was that Receivers would return less to 
Assignees than to Senders, feeling that they had a moral obligation to 
Senders that they did not to Assignees. There was no main between-subjects 
difference in return to Senders and Assignees, though the trend was in the 
predicted direction. Receivers who returned to the Sender first gave an 
average of 4.4 tokens; those who returned to the Assignee first gave an 
average of 4.1 tokens. There was no between-subjects difference in 
generosity or stinginess.  
Although subjects were not sensitive to the between-subjects 
manipulation, the within-subjects results were highly significant. An 
average subject returned about one token less to the Assignee than to the 
Sender. Receivers passed an average of 4.74 tokens to Senders and 3.79 
tokens to Assignees (t=3.78, df=116, p=.0002). The default rate (passing 
back less than 6) was 25.6% when Receivers were returning to Senders, but 
                                                 
32 There were some differences in responses by sex. Female Receivers returned 
significantly more overall than male. Collapsing across conditions, women returned an 
average of 4.7 tokens and men 3.7 (t=2.40, df=83.4, p=.018). However, there were no 
significant sex differences in terms of the overall hypothesis; both men and women 
returned less to Assignees than Senders. 
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43.6% when they were returning to Assignees. The difference was 
significant irrespective of condition; that is, subjects who returned to 
Senders first subsequently returned less to Assignees, and subjects who 
returned to Assignees first subsequently increased their returns to Senders. 
This result is surprising in light of the strong order effects in within-subjects 
analyses from Studies 1 and 2. One explanation is that subjects have a 
difficult time justifying defection toward a particular person to whom they 
have made a promise, whereas in the first study the duty to reciprocate may 
involve more “moral wiggle room.”33 
Figure 4. Receiver returns to Senders and Assignees, in between- 



















Note: Graph shows between- and within-subjects comparisons of Receivers’ returns in 
Study 3, measured in $0.50 tokens, to either the original Sender in a Trust game, or to a 
third-party, the Assignee, to whom the Sender has sold the rights to the Receiver’s return. 
Between-subjects data is a comparison between subjects who made the return-to-Sender 
decision first and those who made the return-to-Assignee decision first. Within-subjects 
comparisons look to how an average Receiver responded to each condition in turn. 
As in the first experiment, subjects reported feeling significantly more 
indebted to Senders than Assignees, with mean indebtedness ratings of 4.64 
and 2.76, respectively (t=9.697, df=116, p<.0001). They rated default with 
respect to the Assignee as 3.43 on a seven-point scale, where 7 was 
“extremely immoral”, but default with respect to the Sender as a 4.81 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Illusory Preference for Fairness? A 
Comment, 4 J. JUDGMENT & DEC. MAKING 467 (noting that generosity observed in 
experiments may be induced by situational norms rather than a real preference for the 
observed outcome, such that introducing ambiguity into the situation gives some “wiggle 
room”). 
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(t=8.576, df=116, p<.0001).  
These results provide some strong, though not unequivocal, support for 
the main hypothesis. When faced with the paired decisions to return to the 
promisee and the assignee, subjects were more generous with promisees. 
However, the effect was diminished when they faced one decision without 
the context of the other. This may be a matter of the salience of the 
distinction, or it may be simply a question of low power. Within-subjects 
results were more uniformly significant across studies. The table below 
shows within-subjects comparisons of default rates in each of the three 
studies.  
Table 2. Within-Subjects Comparisons of Default Rates, Studies 1-3 
 Returning to Sender Returning to Assignee 
Study 1 38.0% 47.8% 
Study 2 33.5% 41.1% 
Study 3 25.6% 43.6% 
Note: In Study 1, default is defined as a return less than 5, the Sender’s initial transfer. In 
Studies 2 and 3, default is any return subject to the one-token penalty. Returns less than 6 
were penalized. All within-subjects default rates are significantly higher for returns to 
Assignees than to Senders. 
The results reported in Table 2 offer some evidence that no matter what the 
explanation, subjects clearly made explicit, conscious distinctions between 
Senders and Assignees in the game setting, and they were willing to allocate 
funds accordingly. The following study represents a preliminary effort to 
demonstrate the relevance of these results for contractual exchange in 
context, using a hypothetical contracts case to draw out subjects’ intuitions 
about assigned contracts. 
V. STUDY 4: ASSIGNED CONTRACT SCENARIO 
The goal of the final study was to investigate the generalizability of the 
first three results. The study predicted that people draw a moral distinction 
between the obligation to perform for a promisee and the obligation to 
perform for the assignee of the original promisee’s rights in the particular 
context of contract. Study 4 was conducted online, using a hypothetical 
contracts case presented in two conditions, a control condition and a 




Subjects were members of an online panel recruited over a ten-year 
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period, mostly through their own efforts at searching for ways to earn 
money by completing questionnaires. Approximately 90 percent of 
respondents were U.S. residents (with the rest mostly from Canada). The 
panel is roughly representative of the adult U.S. population in terms of 
income, age, and education but not in terms of sex, because (for unknown 
reasons) women predominate in this respondent pool. An email was sent to 
about 500 members of the panel with the title of the study, the payment, and 
a link to the survey site. After 160 subjects had responded, the link was 
disabled and the study was closed.  
 
The first page provided brief instructions.34 Each subsequent page 
described a hypothetical contract situation, and asked subjects to answer 
follow-up questions, including a space for optional comments. Subjects 
were required to answer all questions (except the optional comments) to 
proceed. The particular experimental comparison described here was part of 
a larger survey project, but I will only report the results of the 
assignment/no assignment comparison.   
 
Each subject saw the case in each of the two conditions, Control and 
Assigned. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups; one 
group saw the Control condition first and the other the Assigned condition. 
After reading each scenario, subjects were asked to report a willingness-to-
accept (WTA) level for breaching a contract.  
This scenario showed subjects an efficient breach situation, and asked 
them to take the perspective of the would-be breacher. The assignment is 
sketched out somewhat crudely from a legal perspective, but it is intended 
to communicate to subjects the basic gist that the promisee’s right to 
performance (a delivery, here) has been sold to a third party without 
consultation with the promisor. Furthermore, the scenario and the questions 
purposely push the subject to think about the contract in economic terms. 
The contract in question is not one with subjective valuation or sentimental 
attachment concerns, and both parties are commercial actors. The contract 
includes a liquidated damages clause in order to suggest that the parties 
themselves had already contemplated the possibility of breach and damages. 
Furthermore, subjects did not have the option of reporting that they would 
not breach at any price, though they could enter a very high number. The 
decision to nudge subjects toward a more economic view of contracts is 
intentional, and, ideally, makes the results presented here conservative. The 
hypothesis is that even when subjects are asked to think about their 
                                                 
34 The study is publicly available at: 
http://finzi.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/ex/tess/mort4.htm. 
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contracts in very cold, rational terms, they still distinguish between the 
promisee and an assignee. 
The Assigned condition read as follows: 
Please imagine that you own a small manufacturing business, 
specializing in computer chips. You have recently been called by a 
retailer to provide 1,000 units of your best-selling chip. It costs you 
$1 to produce each unit, and you will sell them for $2 each, so you 
will make a total profit of $1,000 on this job. The retailer is happy 
with this price, as the next-cheapest manufacturer is charging $3,000 
for the same order. You sign a basic form contract, agreeing on the 
price, the delivery date, and the specifications of the parts. The 
contract also includes the following clause: 
“If the delivery is not made for any reason, Manufacturer will pay 
Johnson Industries $1,000 in money damages.” 
Shortly after signing the contract, the retailer sells the contract to 
another company, Wilson Computers. This means that Johnson 
Industries sold their right to buy the chips at the stated price to 
Wilson. The transfer of the contract will not affect your obligations 
in any way, just who will receive the delivery. 
A week before you are scheduled to deliver the parts, an out-of-town 
client calls to place a large, rush order for 1,000 computer chips. The 
out-of-town client is in a hurry and really wants to impress a big 
customer, and so they offer much more than your usual going rate. 
However, you are not a big enough operation to be able to provide 
chips for both customers. If you do not sell the chips to Wilson 
Computer, you will have to pay them $1,000 under the contract. 
(When a contract is sold, all of the rights and obligations are 
transferred, including any provisions for money damages.) 
You were expecting a $1,000 profit. You have to pay Wilson 
Computers $1,000, and it will cost you another $1,000 to produce 
the chips, meaning that any offer from the out-of-town client over 
$3,000 would be profitable for you. Given that, what is the smallest 
amount the out-of-town client could offer such that you would 
accept that job? 
The Control case was identical except that it omitted mention of Wilson 
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Computers. Subjects reported their answer to the main dependent variable 
in a free-response box. If they gave a number smaller than 3000 or larger 
than 10000, they saw a pop-up box that read, “You have entered [their 
response]. Is this what you intended?”35 Subjects were also asked to report 




160 subjects were paid $1.50 each to complete the short study. Ages 
ranged from 20 to 71, with a median age of 41. 33% of respondents were 
men. There were no significant effects of sex on responses. 
Overall, subjects in the Assigned Contract group indicated that they 
would breach for substantially less money than subjects in the Control 
group in a between-subjects analysis. In the Control case, subjects indicated 
that they would require $5,095.17, compared to $4332.22 in the Assigned 
case (t=2.381, df=135.13, p=.019). Subjects also reported that it would be 
significantly more morally wrong to breach in the Control case (t=1.945, 
df=127.96, p=.054). On a 100-point scale, they rated the immorality of 
breach as 62.1 in the Control case, and 52.3 in the Assigned case. Both 
variables were also significantly different within-subject. That is, for a 
given subject, the average mean difference on the morality score between 
conditions was 7.96 (t=4.664, df=158, p<.0001) and the average mean 
difference for the WTA variable was $231.33 (t=2.25, df=149, p=.026). 









                                                 
35  
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Figure 5. Lowest dollar amount at which subjects indicate 
















Note: Data from Study 4, showing between- and within-subjects analyses of subjects 
differential willingness-to-accept responses in efficient breach scenarios, depending on 
whether the recipient of performance is the original promisee (Control) or the assignee 
(Assigned). 
Although the within- and between-subjects trends went clearly in the 
same direction here, the magnitude of the difference, particularly for the 
WTA variable, is quite different. An additional analysis compared the 
between-subjects responses of subjects who showed no within-subject 
difference on the Morality and WTA variables. That is, I confined the 
analysis to subjects who gave identical answers across conditions, and then 
compared the WTA response of those in the Control condition, who saw the 
Control question first, to the WTA response of those in the Assigned 
condition, who saw the Assigned question first. The pattern of results was 
nearly identical to that of the larger data set—many subjects explicitly 
reported that the cases should be treated the same, but in fact their responses 
depended heavily on which condition they were in.36 This means that even 
subjects who did not explicitly believe that the two situations should be 
                                                 
36 Of the 111 subjects who said that they would breach at the same dollar amount 
irrespective of assignment, those who saw Control said that they would not breach for less 
than $5044.81; those who saw Assigned first said that they would not breach for less than 
$4371.59. The difference is marginally significant, two-tailed (t=1.850, df=101.57, 
p=.067). The same trend is true for the 88 subjects who reported that there was no moral 
difference between the two conditions. Of that sub-category, those who saw the Control 
case first rated breach as a 61.60 on the immorality scale, and those who saw Assigned first 
had an average immorality rating of 50.86. The difference is not significant (t=1.528, 
df=73.35, p=.131), but the direction and magnitude of the difference are in line with that of 
the overall subject pool. 
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treated differently did treat them differently when the items were presented 
separately and subjects had no basis for comparison.37  
VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Taken together, these four studies have two overarching results. First, 
subjects believe that it is less immoral to behave selfishly toward an 
assignee than toward a promisee; second, they in fact behave more selfishly 
when paired with an assignee. Players in Studies 1 and 3 reported that they 
had more positive feelings for the Sender than the Assignee felt less 
indebted to the Assignee than the Sender, and felt that it was less immoral 
to return nothing to the Assignee than to return nothing to the Sender. 
Subjects in Study 4 reported that breach was less immoral in the assigned 
condition.  
Overall, study participants’ financial decisions reflected their moral 
judgments. In all three games, Receivers who participated in both two-party 
and assigned contract conditions returned significantly less overall to the 
Assignee than to the original Sender. Studies 1 and 2 also showed between-
subjects effects of the assignment manipulation, meaning that even when 
subjects were not primed to think comparatively about the Receiver and the 
Assignee, they still responded as predicted. Finally, the results from Study 4 
show preliminary evidence that the intuition demonstrated in the 
experimental games is robust in the contracts context. 
These results fit squarely into the growing body of research on the 
connection between moral and legal decision-making. In each of the four 
studies, within-subjects differences were significant. That is, participants 
who thought about the difference between two-party and assigned contracts 
determined that the moral obligation of the assigned contract was less 
compelling (or perhaps that the moral satisfaction of altruism was 
diminished with respect to the assignee); in turn, they were less likely to 
perform in the face of economic incentives to default. In at least some cases, 
this formulation appears to be at the level of conscious thought. In addition 
to the explicit view that selling a contract weakens its moral force, these 
results also indicate that assigning a contract may have some implicit, non-
conscious framing effects, as evidenced by the between-subjects results in 
Studies 1, 2, and 4. 
                                                 
37 Notice that this analysis also suggests that subjects’ beliefs about likely reputation 
effects were not the primary driver of their responses. If they believed that breaching a non-
assigned contract would be more expensive because of increased reputation costs—
presumably a conscious consideration—the within-subjects difference would mirror the 
between-subjects difference. 
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What these results cannot do is identify how these two effects (the 
conscious belief and the implicit prime) relate to each other in a given 
context, which would require a better understanding of the psychological 
mechanism at play. There are at least three distinct explanations for a 
subject’s preference for promisees over assignees. The first is a basic 
reciprocity effect, in which the promise is irrelevant, and the only question 
is whether or not one’s counterparty has done something worthy of 
reciprocal generosity. In this view, we might see less performance on an 
assigned contract because the promisor has no feelings of goodwill or 
gratitude toward the assignee. This explanation is in line with the first two 
studies, which show the basic difference between returns to promisees vs. 
assignees in a study with no explicit promising element.  
A second possible explanation is that promising itself is party-specific. 
It may not matter what the promisee has done to deserve the performance, it 
only matters that the promisor has made the commitment. This explanation 
would suggest that the promise itself is narrow, that it includes both the 
direct and indirect object: I promise to do something for someone. Once a 
particular promisee is out of the picture, non-performance is not immoral.  
Third, the reason that people feel differently about assigned contracts 
may be that the assignment is a signal that the transaction is purely 
economic, impersonal, and that the informal norms of reciprocity and 
promise are irrelevant. Once one party signals that trust is irrelevant, 
breaching the contract is not a breach of trust. This effect may operate at the 
level of conscious belief or as an implicit prime. In Study 4, even subjects 
who reported that the promisee and assignee ought to be treated the same 
often treated them differently, favoring promisees.  
In all likelihood, the assigned contract effect is overdetermined, with 
each of these explanations playing a causal role. In fact, typical assignments 
also involve other factors that are likely to push in the same direction. For 
example, in these studies, there are no salient differences between assignors 
and assignees, but in the real world, it is usually small firms assigning rights 
to larger ones. Insofar as people may feel more sympathetic toward a 
smaller, more personal counterparty, this would compound the assignment 
effect. Future research should focus on how the norms of reciprocity and 
promise relate to each other, and how we can tease apart their effects on 
decision-making.  
Finally, these studies have several methodological limitations, which I 
iterate here in order to suggest an appropriate level of caution in interpreting 
the results, and to note some unanswered questions that could be fruitfully 
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addressed in future research. The first limitation of these studies is that they 
are uniformly low stakes. Subjects have no material incentive to respond 
truthfully to a hypothetical case, and the prospect of $5-$7 in the laboratory 
game may be trivial. Generalizability may be further limited by some 
fundamental differences between the set-up of the laboratory game and the 
typical features of a contract. Most important, Studies 1 through 3 followed 
experimental economics norms and did not use any words related to 
contracting, including “promise,” “contract,” or even “assignment.”  
Results from Study 4, which gave a richer context to the decision, show 
the same predicted result, but have other limitations in terms of 
extrapolating from a briefly described, no-stakes hypothetical to a real 
contracts context. Further, interpreting the results of Study 4 is difficult 
insofar as we cannot be sure how subjects interpreted the assignment. Some 
subjects may have understood that a long-term assignment and delegation 
arrangement was made, whereas others may have simply understood (as 
intended) that the delivery should be made to a new person.  
The goal of this project was to test the basic assignment effect. Taken 
together, the studies offer some evidence that the effect exists, with 
important caveats about generalizing too broadly. Below, I suggest that the 
next step for this kind of research is to turn to the real world, using existing 
data and field studies to ask how assignment matters for contract 
performance in particular industries. 
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH: ASSIGNED CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD  
 
Fruitful avenues of future research may lie in studying the assignment 
effect within discrete contracts domains, using existing experiments as well 
as field data. This paper can offer only the most preliminary treatment of 
these implications, so I sketch them out primarily as a means of motivating 
new behavioral decision research in particular, high-stakes contracts. For 
example, legal scholars have assumed that only the reason that debt 
collectors draw so much ire is because of their outrageous, aggressive 
tactics.38 This research suggests, though, that even when a debt collection 
agency legally owns the right to repayment, its demand for repayment may 
not have the same motivating force as the moral obligation to pay the 
creditor back for its valuable services. Accounts that focus solely on abuses 
by collection agencies ignore the fact that many debtors are confused and 
outraged in part because their respective collectors are not parties to whom 
they intended to be bound. Similarly, in the mortgage context, debt is often 
                                                 
38 William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 48 (1956). 
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assigned well before the borrower is in trouble, but the assignment may 
nonetheless affect repayment rates. Economists studying mortgage-backed 
securities have found that even controlling for borrower characteristics (e.g., 
riskiness of the loan), foreclosure rates are higher for mortgage-backed 
securities in which originating lenders are not affiliated with the ultimate 
sponsor or servicer of the pool,39 and other experimental findings suggest 
that the identity of the mortgage holder may be one factor (among many, to 
be sure) to affect a strategic default decision.40 Until now, the focus of this 
kind of study has been on how and whether originators have shared 
information about borrowers with subsequent investors. This paper suggests 
another avenue of inquiry—whether or not buyers knew and cared that their 
loan had been transferred or securitized. Finally, assignment has been 
explicitly raised as a threat to the success of microlending contracts.41 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have been particularly savvy about using 
peer lending circles, but case studies of creditors’ efforts to collect on loans 
from MFIs in Uganda, Kenya, Indonesia, and India suggest that when the 
local MFI must transfer servicing to a creditor organization on liquidation, 
borrowers are much less likely to repay.42 Scholars and policy-makers have 
approached this as a problem of complicated logistics, but, as in the first 
two examples, an additional problem may be that the replacement of the 
original institution is not in accord with borrowers’ understandings of their 
legal and moral obligations under the loan agreement. These are areas in 
which moral intuitions about contract assignment may have noticeable 
effects on borrower behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
 
As legal and economics scholars have pointed out, the ability to freely 
transfer contracts is vital to modern society. It permits parties to shift risk to 
those who can best bear it, in turn creating a flow of credit to those who 
most value it. However, the psychology of an obligation changes when the 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, Works of Friction?Originator-
Sponsor Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-Backed Securities 1, 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/unites/finance/pdf/Frictions.pdf. 
40 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral 
Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1574 (2011) (finding that 
participants in a questionnaire study reported that they would default on a home with a 
higher value when the loan had been assigned). 
41 Jessica Diehl, Microfinance in Emerging Markets: The Effects of the Current 
Economic Crisis and the Role of Securitization, 5 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.)  37, 41 
(2009)(describing the costs and benefits of using securitization to fund microfinance). 
42 Daniel Rozas, Throwing in the Towel: Lessons from MFI Liquidations (2009), 
available at: http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.38716. 
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obligation is sold. Of course, moral convictions about the meaning of 
contract are beside the point when performance is much cheaper than 
breach. But when performance is costly, morals do matter. These studies 
offer preliminary evidence that when contracts are assigned, they have less 
moral force, because there is no room for reciprocity. When a debt is sold, it 
becomes impossible to repay one’s lender and fulfill the moral obligation of 
loan, leaving the moral status of performance to the third party unclear. 
Overall, it may be easier to transfer a legal obligation than a moral one.  
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Appendix: Study 3 Instructions, Quiz, and Game 
Welcome.  This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making.  
You will be paid for your participation in the experiment, as detailed on the 
next page.  Please do not talk or try to communicate with other participants 
until the conclusion of the experiment.  If at any time you have a question 
or there is a problem with your computer interface, please raise your hand 
and wait for an experimenter to come by and assist you.  Throughout the 
experiment, it is important that you not continue on to the next task until the 
experimenter asks you to do so.  At these junctures, you will be prompted 
NOT to click "continue" until the experimenter asks you to do so. 
This experiment does not use deception.  Everything in the instructions 
that follow is true, including the rules and payoffs. Also keep in mind that 
everyone is receiving the same set of instructions. 
 
--- Next Screen --- 
 
For this task you will be asked to make decisions that affect yours 
and/or others payments in the following manner. First, each participant in 
the lab will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 players. The other two 
members of your group will be people in this room; there are no computer 
players. There are three different roles in the group (A, B, and C), and each 
participant will make a decision in each role.  After all decisions have been 
made, the computer will randomly determine which role will be assigned to 
each person in your group, and you will be paid according to the decisions 
you made in that role as well as those of your group in their roles 
respectively. Please note that all decisions will be made using tokens and 
that each token will be worth $0.50 when calculating your final payment. 
You will all be playing the following game: 
 
Player A will begin the game with 10 tokens, Player B will begin with 0 
tokens, and Player C with 11 tokens.43 Player A will make the first decision 
and will decide whether to keep their initial 10, or keep 5 and pass 5 to 
Player B.  If Player A decides to pass 5, that money will be tripled, and 
Player B will receive 15.  This leaves Player A with 5, Player B with 15, 
and Player C with 11.  Once Player B has received the 15, he or she will 
have an opportunity to return any amount of that money to Player A on an 
equal exchange rate.  This means that for every dollar Player B returns, 
Player A gains 1 on top of the 5 they still have, and Player B loses 1 from 
                                                 
43 In Study 3 only, and on this screen only, players read the incorrect information that 
Player C would be endowed with 10 tokens. The research assistant running the sessions 
informed players of the mistake, which was not repeated on the following pages. 
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the 15 they have. 
 
However, once Player A has given 5 to Player B, Player A can transfer 
the “right” to whatever amount Player B returns to the third person, Player 
C, for a fixed price of 6 tokens. If Player A wishes to transfer to Player C, C 
will be asked if they want to give A 6 tokens for the right to B’s return. If 
both Players A and C agree to the sale, Player A will have 11 tokens and 
Player C will have 5 tokens. Player B would then return any amount of their 
15 tokens to Player C, and Player C would end up with their 5 tokens, plus 
whatever amount Player B returned to them. Please note that Player B will 
be aware to whom they are returning tokens. 
 
 
--- Next Screen --- 
 
A summary of the game is as follows:  
 
• Player A begins with 10 tokens, Player B with 0 tokens, and Player 
C with 11 tokens. 
• Player A has an option to pass 5 tokens to Player B, which then 
triples to 15 tokens. 
• If Player A chooses to pass 5 tokens, he then has the option to 
transfer the right to Player B's return for 6 tokens to Player C. 
• If Player A wishes to transfer the right to the return, Player C will be 
asked if they want to accept this transfer. 
• If Player A and Player C agree to the transfer, Player B passes 
money back to Player C. 
• If Player A does not want to transfer the right to the return, or Player 
C does not accept the transfer, Player B passes money back to Player 
A. 
• If Player B returns any amount less than 6 tokens, regardless of who 
they are passing back to, they pay a 1-token penalty to the 
experimenter. 
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Remember, you will make decisions for three different roles, but you 
will only be paid for one iteration of the game. Furthermore, all three roles 
are equally likely to be chosen by the computer for a given person. 
Therefore, you should make decisions in each role in the manner that you 
would actually like them to be made in the case that that role determines 
your payment. 
If you have any questions about the rules of the game, the roles, or the 
payment format, please raise your hand now and an experimenter will come 
by to assist you.  





The quiz is intended to test your understanding of the basic rules and 
instructions of the game you are about to participate in. There will be six 
True/False questions, and you will need to get all six correct in order to 
advance. If you have any questions about the instructions or the answers, 




[Each quiz question was its own screen. After clicking either “True” or 
“False” for each question, subjects saw an explanation of the answer. If 
their response was incorrect, they saw a pop-up window telling them that 
they had answered incorrectly and must try again.] 
 
Question 1: Each participant in the lab will be randomly assigned to a 
group of 4 players. 
 
False, each group has three players (none of whom are computer 
players). 
 
Question 2: Player A makes the first decision and decides whether to 
keep the initial 10 tokens or to pass as many tokens to Player B as Player A 
likes. 
False, Player A starts with 10 tokens and has the option of either 
keeping the initial 10 tokens or keeping 5 tokens and passing 5 tokens to 
Player B. 
 
Question 3: If Player A passes 5 tokens to Player B, those tokens are 
then quadrupled. 
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False, if Player A passes the 5 tokens to Player B then those tokens are 
tripled. This results in Player A having 5 tokens, Player B having 15 tokens, 
and Player C still having 11 tokens. 
 
Question 4: If Player A has given 5 tokens to Player B, Player A can 
then try to transfer the “right” to whatever amount Player B returns to a 
third player, Player C, for a fixed price of 10 tokens. 
 
False, Player A can try to transfer the “right” to whatever amount Player 
B returns for a fixed price of 6 tokens. If Player C accepts this transfer, 
Player A will have 11 tokens, Player B will have 15 tokens minus whatever 
amount is given to Player C, and Player C will have 5 tokens plus whatever 
amount Player B returns. 
 
Question 5: If Player A has given 5 tokens to Player B, then Player A 
can keep the returns from Player B by choosing not to transfer the “rights” 
to Player C. 
 
True, Player A has the option of trying to transfer his “rights” to player 
C for 6 tokens or keeping the rights and taking the returns of Player B. 
 
Question 6: Player B is not aware of whom he is returning tokens to and 
does not have to pay the experimenter if he returns any amount less than 6. 
 
False, Player B is aware of who he/she is returning tokens to and does 






You are starting your decisions in the role of Player B. Player A’s 
decision to transfer money to you may depend on your willingness to return 
money to him or her. Please answer the following question, which we will 
show to Player A before he or she makes her transfer decision. If Player A 
transfers 5 to you, do you agree to return at least 6? 
 
If Player A transfers 5 tokens to me, I agree to return no less than 6 to 
him/her.  
 
_ I agree  --I do not agree 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1984656





You will now make your return decision as Player B. Keep in mind that 
since you do not know which role will count towards your payment, you 
should make every decision as if it will count. There is no strategic 
incentive to do otherwise.  
 
Please note that Players A and C will now be given a 5 token bonus by the 
experimenter at the end of the experiment. 
 
You are Player B and have been given 5 tokens by Player A, which has now 
tripled to 15 tokens. Player A did not transfer the right to any amount you 
return, so you will be returning money to Player A. Please write in the 
amount, if any, that you wish to give to Player A. 
 
Remember—if you give back any amount less than 6 tokens to Player A, 
you will automatically pay 1 token to the experimenter. 
 
Please write in the amount of tokens you wish to give to Player A in this 
box. Note that you cannot give more than your 15 token allotment. Please 




You will now make another decision in the role of Player B. 
 
You are Player B and have been given 5 tokens by Player A, which has now 
tripled to 15 tokens. Player A has since transferred the right to any amount 
you return to Player C, and Player C has accepted the transfer. Please write 
in the amount, if any, that you wish to give to Player C. 
 
Remember—if you give back any amount less than 6 tokens to Player C, 
you will automatically pay 1 token to the experimenter. 
 
Please write in the amount of tokens you wish to give to Player c in this 
box. Note that you cannot give more than your 15 token allotment. Please 
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You are now making decisions in the role of Player A. Please keep in mind 
that you will now be given a 5 token bonus at the end of the experiment.  
 
As Player A, you have been given 10 tokens from the experimenter and 
must choose how it is used. You make keep the 10 tokens now, or you may 
pass 5 tokens to Player B. 
 
If you pass 5 to Player B, that money will be tripled to 15 and Player B, 
who started with 0, may send you back any amount up to 15 tokens. Your 
final payment would therefore be made up of the 5 tokens you still have, 
plus the amount given back to you by Player B (if any).  
 
However, once you have passed the 5 to Player B, you may also try to 
transfer the right to any money returned by Player B to a third player, Player 
C, for a set price of 6 tokens. If you choose to transfer the right to Player 
B’s return for 6 tokens, Player C will decide whether they wish to accept 
this transfer for the rights to B’s return for 6 tokens, and if they do, your 
final payment will be the 11 tokens (the 5 you have plus the 6 from 
transferring the rights). 
 
If Player B AGREED to return no less than 6 to you, please decide whether 
you would like to keep the 10 tokens or give 5 tokens to Player B. 
 




You are now making decisions in the role of Player A. Please keep in mind 
that you will now be given a 5 token bonus at the end of the experiment.  
 
As Player A, you have been given 10 tokens from the experimenter and 
must choose how it is used. You make keep the 10 tokens now, or you may 
pass 5 tokens to Player B. 
 
If you pass 5 to Player B, that money will be tripled to 15 and Player B, 
who started with 0, may send you back any amount up to 15 tokens. Your 
final payment would therefore be made up of the 5 tokens you still have, 
plus the amount given back to you by Player B (if any).  
 
However, once you have passed the 5 to Player B, you may also try to 
transfer the right to any money returned by Player B to a third player, Player 
C, for a set price of 6 tokens. If you choose to transfer the right to Player 
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B’s return for 6 tokens, Player C will decide whether they wish to accept 
this transfer for the rights to B’s return for 6 tokens, and if they do, your 
final payment will be the 11 tokens (the 5 you have plus the 6 from 
transferring the rights). 
 
If Player B DID NOT agree to return no less than 6 to you, please decide 
whether you would like to keep the 10 tokens or give 5 tokens to Player B. 
 




You are now making decisions in the role of Player A. Please keep in mind 
that you will now be given a 5 token bonus at the end of the experiment.  
 
As Player A, you have been given 10 tokens from the experimenter and 
must choose how it is used. You make keep the 10 tokens now, or you may 
pass 5 tokens to Player B. 
 
If you pass 5 to Player B, that money will be tripled to 15 and Player B, 
who started with 0, may send you back any amount up to 15 tokens. Your 
final payment would therefore be made up of the 5 tokens you still have, 
plus the amount given back to you by Player B (if any).  
 
However, once you have passed the 5 to Player B, you may also try to 
transfer the right to any money returned by Player B to a third player, Player 
C, for a set price of 6 tokens. If you choose to transfer the right to Player 
B’s return for 6 tokens, Player C will decide whether they wish to accept 
this transfer for the rights to B’s return for 6 tokens, and if they do, your 
final payment will be the 11 tokens (the 5 you have plus the 6 from 
transferring the rights). 
 
For the situation where B AGREED to return no less than 6 tokens, do you 
want to keep the rights to Player B’s return, or transfer them to Player C for 
6 tokens (assume that C has agreed to the transfer, otherwise you will have 
to accept B’s return)? 
 




You are now making decisions in the role of Player A. Please keep in mind 
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that you will now be given a 5 token bonus at the end of the experiment.  
 
As Player A, you have been given 10 tokens from the experimenter and 
must choose how it is used. You make keep the 10 tokens now, or you may 
pass 5 tokens to Player B. 
 
If you pass 5 to Player B, that money will be tripled to 15 and Player B, 
who started with 0, may send you back any amount up to 15 tokens. Your 
final payment would therefore be made up of the 5 tokens you still have, 
plus the amount given back to you by Player B (if any).  
 
However, once you have passed the 5 to Player B, you may also try to 
transfer the right to any money returned by Player B to a third player, Player 
C, for a set price of 6 tokens. If you choose to transfer the right to Player 
B’s return for 6 tokens, Player C will decide whether they wish to accept 
this transfer for the rights to B’s return for 6 tokens, and if they do, your 
final payment will be the 11 tokens (the 5 you have plus the 6 from 
transferring the rights). 
 
For the situation where B DID NOT agree to return no less than 6 tokens, 
do you want to keep the rights to Player B’s return, or transfer them to 
Player C for 6 tokens (assume that C has agreed to the transfer, otherwise 
you will have to accept B’s return)? 
 




You will now make your decision as Player C. What do you want to do if 
Player B AGREES to transfer back 6 tokens to Player A if A invests, and 
Player A chooses to give 5 tokens to Player B but then wishes to transfer the 
rights to B’s return to you for 6 tokens? 
 
If you choose to accept the transfer, you will give 6 tokens of your 11 to 
Player A and will receive more tokens depending on what Player B returns 
to you. If you decline the transfer, you will keep your 11 tokens and Player 
A will receive the amount returned from Player B. 
 
__Keep your current endowment of 11 tokens  __Transfer 6 tokens to 
Player A and receive 
Player C’s back-
transfer 
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---Next Screen--- 
Now that you’ve made your first choice, what do you want to do if Player B 
DOES NOT agree to transfer back 6 tokens to Player A if A invests, and 
Player A chooses to give 5 tokens to Player B but then wishes to transfer the 
rights to B’s return to you for 6 tokens? 
Remember, if you choose to accept the transfer, you will give 6 tokens of 
your 11 to Player A and will receive more tokens depending on what Player 
B returns to you. If you decline the transfer, you will keep your 11 tokens 
and Player A will receive the amount returned from Player B. 
__Keep your current endowment of 11 tokens __Transfer 6 
tokens to Player 




[Players then answered the questionnaire described in the Methods section 
of Study 1, and received their final payout information on the final screen.] 
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